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A network is a graph where the nodes represent agents and  an arc exists betw een 
two nodes if the corresponding agents in teract bilaterally. An exogeneous value 
function gives the value o f each netw ork, while an allocation  rule describes how  the 
value is distributed am ongst the agents. M. Jackson and  A. W olinsky (1996, J. Econ. 
Theory 71, 44-74) have recently dem onstrated  a poten tial conflict betw een stab ility  
and efficiency in this fram ew ork. In this paper, we use an  im plem entation ap p ro a c h  
to  see whether the tension between stability an d  efficiency can  be resolved. Journal 
o f  Economic Literature Classification N um bers: C72, D20. <: 1997 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
The interaction between agents can often be fruitfully described by a 
network structure or graph, where the nodes represent the agents and an arc 
exists between two nodes if the corresponding agents interact bilaterally. 
Network structures have been used in a wide variety of contexts ranging 
from social networks (Wellman and Berkowitz [1 6 ]) , information trans­
mission (Goyal [4 ] ) ,  internal organization of firms (M arschak and 
Reichelstein [1 0 ]), cost allocation schemes (Henriet and M oulin [ 7 ] ) ,  to 
the structure of airline routes (Hendricks et al. [ 6 ] ) . 1
In a recent paper, Jackson and Wolinsky [ 8 ] focus on the stability  of 
networks. Their analysis is designed to give predictions concerning which 
networks are likely to form when self-interested agents can choose to form 
new links or severe existing links. They use a specification where a value 
function gives the value (or total product) of each graph or network, while 
an allocation rule gives the distribution of value amongst the agents 
forming the network. A principal result o f their analysis shows that efficient
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graphs (that is, graphs of maximum value) may not be stable when the 
allocation  rule treats individuals symmetrically.
The main purpose of this paper is to subject the potential conflict 
betw een stability and efficiency of graphs to further scrutiny. In order to do 
th is, we follow Dutta et al. [3 ]  and assume that agents’ decisions on 
w hether or not to form a link with other agents can be represented as 
a gam e in strategic form . 2 In this “link formation” game, each player 
announces a set of players with whom he or she wants to form a link. 
A  link between two players is formed if both players want the link. This 
ru le  determines the graph corresponding to any n-tuple o f announcements. 
T h e  value function and the allocation rule then give the payoff function of 
th e  strategic form game.
Since the link formation game is a well-defined strategic form game, one 
c a n  use any equilibrium concept to analyze the formation of networks. In 
th is  paper, we will define a graph to be strongly stable (respectively weakly 
sta b le )  if it corresponds to a strong Nash equilibrium (respectively coalition- 
p r o o f  Nash equilibrium) of the link formation game. Although Jackson and 
W olinsky [ 8 ] did not use the link formation game, their specification 
assum ed that only nvo-person coalitions can form; their notion of pairwise 
sta b ility  is implied by our concept of strong stability. Hence, it follows 
straightaway from their analysis that there is a conflict between strong 
stability and efficiency if the allocation rule is symmetric.
H ow  can we ensure that efficient graphs will form? One possibility is to 
u se  allocation rules which are not symmetric. For instance, fix a vector of 
w eights w =  (w, ,  w2, ..., w„). Call an allocation rule w-fair if the gains or 
lo sses to players i and j  from the formation of the new link (ij) is propor­
tional to Wj/wj. w-fair rules are symmetric only if w, =  wy for all i and j. 
However, the vector of weights w can be chosen so that there is only a 
“slight” departure from symmetry. We first show that the class of w-fair 
rules coincides with the class o f weighted Shapley values of an appropriately 
defined transferable utility game. We then go on to construct a value 
function under which no efficient graph is strongly stable for any w-fair 
allocation rule. Thus, the relaxation of symmetry in this direction does not 
help.
A second possibility is to use weak stability instead of strong stability. 
However, again we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency, symmetry 
and (weak) stability.
We then go on to adopt an implementation or mechanism design approach. 
Suppose the implicit assumption or prediction is that only those graphs
2 T his gam e was originally suggested by M yerson [1 2 ]  and  subsequently  used by Q in [1 4 ], 
See also  H art and  K urz [ 5 ]  w ho discuss a sim ilar strategic form  gam e in the con tex t o f thy 
endogeneous form ation  o f  coalition structures.
which correspond to strong Nash equilibria of the link formation game will 
form. Then, our interest in the ethical properties of the allocation rule 
should be restricted only to how the rule behaves on the class o f  these 
graphs. Hence, if we want symmetry of the allocation rule, we should be 
satisfied if the allocation rule is symmetric on the subdomain o f strongly 
stable graphs.
We analyse two specific problems within this general, approach. In the 
first design problem, we construct an allocation rule which ensures that
(i) the class of strongly stable graphs is a nonempty subset o f the set of 
efficient graphs, and (ii) satisfies the restriction that the rule is symmetric 
on the class of strongly stable graphs. This result is proved under a very 
mild restriction on the class of value functions. The second result is much 
stronger, but is proved for a more restrictive class of value functions. More 
specifically, we construct an allocation rule which (given the restrictions on 
the class of value functions) guarantees that (i) there is at least one strongly 
stable graph, (ii) all weakly stable graphs are efficient, and (iii) the 
allocation rule is symmetric on the class of weakly stable graphs. Thus, this 
achieves a kind of “double” implementation in strong Nash and coalition- 
proof Nash equilibrium.
A common feature of the allocation rules constructed by us is that these 
distribute the value of stable graphs equally amongst all agents. Obviously, 
this ensures symmetry of the allocation rules on the class of stable graphs. 
O f course, the rules do not treat agents symmetrically on some graphs 
which are not stable. Indeed, the asymmetries are carefully constructed so 
as to ensure that the other requirements of the design problem(s) are 
satisfied.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide definitions 
of some key concepts. Section 3 describes the link formation game, while 
Section 4 contains the results. We conclude in Section 5.
2. SOME DEFINITIONS
Let N =  {1, 2 ,...,« }  be a finite set of agents with « ^ 3 .  Interactions 
between agents are represented by graphs whose vertices represent the 
players, and whose arcs depict the pairwise relations. The complete graph, 
denoted g N, is the set o f all subsets of N  of size 2. G is the set of all possible 
graphs on N, so that G = { g \ g c  g ;V} .
Given any g e G ,  let N(g)  =  { i e N\ 3j  such that (ij) e  g\ .
The link (ij) is the subset of N  containing i, j. g +  (ij) and g — (ij) are the 
graphs obtained from g  by adding and subtracting the link (ij) respectively.
i and j  are connected in g  if there is a sequence {z0, ..., iK) such that 
h =  U lK =  j  and (ikik + ]) e g  for all k =  0 ,1 ,..., K — 1. We will use C(g)  to
denote the set o f connected components o f g. g  is said to be fu lly connected 
(respectively connected on S) if all pairs of agents in N  (respectively in S) 
are connected, g  is totally disconnected if g =  { 0 } .  If h is a component of 
g, then N(h) =  { i \ ( i j ) eh  for some j e N \ { i } } ,  and nh denotes the cardinality 
of N{h).
The value of a gi;aph is represented by a function v: G IR. We will only 
be interested in the set V of such functions satisfying Component Additivity.
D e f in it io n  2.1. A value function is component additive if v(g) =
E*eC(g) C(^)-
We interpret the value function to indicate the total “output” produced 
by agents in N  when they are “organized” according to a particular graph. 
For instance, the members of N  may be workers in a firm. The graph g  
then represents the internal organization of the firm, that is the structure 
of communication amongst the workers. Alternatively, N  could be a set of 
(tax) auditors and supervisors, and g  could represent a particular hierarchical 
structure of auditors and supervisors. In this case, v(g) is the (expected) tax 
revenue realized from a population of tax payers when g  is in “operation.”
It is worth emphasizing at this point that the value function is a very 
general concept. In particular, it is more general than Myerson’s [1 1 ]  
games with cooperation structure. A cooperation structure is a graph in 
our terminology. Given any exogeneously specified transferable utility 
game ( N, u)  and a graph g, we define for each S<=N,  the restricted graph 
on S  as g \ S  =  {(ij) e g\ i ,  j  e S ] . The graph-restricted game (N, us ) specifies 
the worth of a coalition as follows.
For all S c jV ,« * (S )=  £  u(N(h)).  (2.1)
A eCU |S)
As (2.1) makes clear, the value or worth of a given set of agents in Myerson’s 
formulation depends on whether they are connected or not, whereas in the 
Jackson Wolinsky approach, the value of a coalition can in principle 
depend on how they are connected.
Given v, g  is strongly efficient if v(g)  >  v(g' ) for all g ' e G.  Let E(v)  
denote the set of strongly efficient graphs.
Finally, an allocation rule Y: V x G->  IR V describes how the value 
associated with each network is distributed to the individual players. Y,(v, g) 
will denote the payoff to player i from graph g  under the value function v. 
Clearly, an allocation rule corresponds to the concept of a solution in 
cooperative game theory.
Given a permutation n : N ->■ N, let g n =  {(ij) \ i =  n(k), j  =  n(l), (kl) e g } . 
Let vn be defined by v7l(g 7t) =  v(g).
The following condition imposes the restriction that all agents should be 
treated symmetrically by the allocation rule. In particular, names o f the 
agents should not determine their allocation.
D e fin it io n  2.2. Y  is anonymous on G' £  G if for all pairs (v, g) e  V x G', 
and for all permutations n, Yn{i)(vH, g K) =  K,(v, g).
Remark 2.3. If Y  is anonymous on G, we say that Y  is fully anonymous.
D e f in it io n  2.4. Y  is component balanced if Y,-(v, g) =  v(h) for
every g e G , h e  C(g).
Component balance implies that cross-subsidization is ruled out. We will 
restrict attention to component balanced allocation rules throughout the 
paper.3
3. THE LINK FORM ATION GAME
In this section, we describe the strategic form game which will be used 
to model the endogenous formation of networks or graphs.4 The following 
description of the link formation game assumes a specific value function v 
and an allocation rule Y. Let y =  (v, Y).
The linking game r(y) is given by the (n +  2)-tuple (N; S , , S „ ,  f y), 
where for each i e N, S,  is player f s  strategy set with S, =  2 V'! and the 
payoff function is the mapping f y: S =  n , F v S, =>IR'V given by
m s ) = Y i(v,g(s) )  (3.1)
for all s e S ,  with
£(>?) =  {(*/)I jes, - ,  i e s j } .  (3.2)
So, a typical strategy of player i in r(y) consists of the set o f players with 
whom i wants to form a link. Then, (3.2) states that a link between / and 
j  forms if and only if they both want to form this link. Hence, each strategy 
vector gives rise to a unique graph g(s).  Finally, the payoff to player i 
associated with s is simply F ,(v, g(s)), the payoff that, is given by the 
allocation rule for the graph induced by s.5
’ Jackson  and  W olinsky [ 8 ]  poin t o u t th a t the conflict between anonym ity, stability , and  
efficiency d isappears if the rule is not com ponent balanced.
4 A um ann and  M yerson [ 1 ] use an extensive  form approach in m odeling the endogeneous 
form ation  of cooperation  structures.
5 W e will say th a t g  is induced by s if g = g(s), where gfs)  satisfies (3.2).
We now define some equilibrium concepts for r(y) .
D e f in it io n  3.1. A strategy vector s* e S  is a .strong Nash equilibrium 
(SNE) of n y ) if there is no T ^ N  and s e S  such that
(i) Sj =  s * for all i $ T.
(ii) /'(.v) >  p;(s* )  for all i e  T.
The second equilibrium concept that will be used in this paper is that of 
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE). In order to define the concept 
of CPNE of r ( y ) ,  we need some more notation. For any T c N ,  and 
4 | 7-e^A'ir =  n ,  c-,vi7'^ i. let r(y,  .S' vi t) denote the game induced on T  
by s%\T. So,
r(y,s*NlT) =  ( T , { S , } iET, r ) ,  (3.3)
where for all j e  T, for all s T e S T, f ] ( s T) =  f ] ( s T, s%, T).
The set of CPNE of /"(y) is defined inductively on the set of players.
D e f i n i t io n  3.2. In a single-player game, s* is a CPNE of r(y) iff .v* 
maximises f ] ( s )  over S. Let r(y) be a game with n players, where n >  1. 
Suppose CPNE have been defined for all games with less than n players. 
Then, (i) s* e S  is self-enforcing if for all T<=N, s* is a CPNE of F(y, .vf, 
and (ii) s* e S  is a CPNE of r ( y )  if it is self-enforcing and moreover 
there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy vector s e S  such that 
p; ( s ) >p; ( s * )  for all i e N .
Our interest lies not in the strategy vectors which are SNE or CPNE  
of r(y) ,  but in the graphs which are induced by these equilibria. This 
motivates the following definition.
D e f in it io n  3.3. g*  is strongly stable [respectively weakly stable] for 
}’= ( v, Y) if g*  is induced by some s which is a SNE [respectively CPNE] 
of r(y) .
Hence, a strongly stable graph is induced or supported by a strategy 
vector which is a strong Nash equilibrium of the linking game. Of course, 
a strongly stable graph must also be weakly stable.
Finally, in order to compare the Jackson-W olinsky notion of pairwise 
stability, suppose the following constraints are imposed on the set of possible 
deviations in Definition 3.1. First, the deviating coalition can contain at 
most two agents. Second, the deviation can consist of severing just one 
existing link or forming one additional link. Then, the set o f graphs which 
are immune to such deviations is called pairwise stable. Obviously, if g* is 
strongly stable, then it must be pairwise stable.
4. THE RESULTS
Notice that strong stability (as well as weak stability) has been defined 
for a specific value function v and allocation rule Y. O f course, which network 
structure is likely to form must depend upon both the value function as 
well as on the allocation rule. Here, we adopt the approach that the value 
function is given exogeneously, while the allocation rule itself can be 
“chosen” or “designed.”
Within this general approach, it is natural to seek to construct allocation 
rules which are (ethically) attractive and which also lead to the formation 
of stable network structures which maximize output, no matter what the 
exogeneously specified value function. This is presumably the underlying 
motive behind Jackson and Wolinsky’s search for a symmetric allocation  
rule under which at least one strongly efficient graph would be pairwise 
stable for every value function.
Given their negative result, we initially impose weaker requirements. First, 
instead of fu ll anonymity, we only ask that the allocation rule be w-fair, a 
condition which is defined presently. However, we show that there can be 
value functions under which no strongly efficient graph is strongly stable .6 
Second, we retain full anonymity but replace strong stability by weak 
stability. Again, we construct a value function under which the unique 
strongly efficient graph is not weakly stable.
Our final results, which are the main results of the paper, explicitly adopt 
an implementation approach to the problem. Assuming that strong Nash  
equilibrium is the “appropriate” concept of equilibrium and that the individual 
agents decide to form network relations through the link formation game 
is equivalent to predicting that only strongly stable graphs will form. Let 
S{y) be the set of strongly stable graphs corresponding to y =  (v, Y). 
Instead of imposing full anonymity, we only require that the allocation rule 
be anonymous on the restricted  domain S(y). However, we now require 
that for all permissible value functions, S(y)  is contained in the set of 
strongly efficient graphs, instead of merely intersecting with it, which was 
the “target” sought to be achieved in the earlier results. We are able to 
construct an allocation rule which satisfies these requirements.
Suppose, however, that the designer has some doubt whether strong 
Nash equilibrium is really the “appropriate” notion of equilibrium. In 
particular, she apprehends that weakly stable graphs may also form. Then, 
she would want to ensure anonymity of the allocation rule over the larger 
class o f weakly stable graphs, as well as efficiency of these graphs. Assuming 
a stronger restriction on the class of permissible value functions, we are 
able to construct an allocation rule which satisfies these requirements. In
6 W e po in t ou t below th a t strong stability  can be replaced by pairw ise stability.
addition the allocation rule also guarantees that the set of strongly stable 
graphs is nonempty.
Our first result uses w-faimess. Fix a vector w =  (w ,,..., w„) 0.
D e f in it io n  4.1. An allocation rule Y  is w-fair if for all v e V ,  for all 
geG,  for all i, j e N ,
—  [  Yi(v, g ) -  Y,-(v, g - ( i j ) ) ]  = —  [  Yj(v, g)  — Yj(v, g - ( i j ) ) ] .
Wj  Wj
In Proposition 4.1 below, we show that the unique allocation rule which 
satisfies w-faimess and component balance is the weighted Shapley value of 
the following characteristic function game.
Take any (v, g ) e V x G .  Recall that for any S £  N,  the restricted graph 
on S  is denoted g\ S. Then, the TU  game «, g is given by:
For all S ^ N ,  uv, g(S) =  ’Zhec(gis) v(h).
Pr o p o sit io n  4.2. For all v e V, the unique w-fair allocation rule Y  which 
satisfies components balance is the weighted Shapley value o f  uv g.
Proof. The proof is omitted since it is a straightforward extension of the 
corresponding result in Dutta et al. [3 ] .
Remark 4.3. This proposition is similar to corresponding results of 
Dutta et al. [3 ]  and Jackson and Wolinsky [ 8 ]. The former proved that 
w-fair allocation rules satisfying component balance are the weighted Shapley 
values (also called weighted Myerson values) o f the graph-restricted game 
given by any exogeneous TU game and any graph g. Of course, the set of 
graph-restricted games is a strict subset of V, and hence Proposition 4.2 is 
a formal generalization o f their result. Jackson and Wolinsky show that 
where w>, =  Wj for all i, j ,  then the unique w-fair allocation rule satisfying 
component balance is the Shapley value of uv g .
Our first result on stability follows. The motivation for proving this 
result is the following. Since the weight vector w can be chosen to make the 
allocation rule “approximately” anonymous (by choosing w to be very close 
to the unit vector ( 1 ,..., 1 ), we may “almost” resolve the tension between 
stability, efficiency and symmetry unearthed by Jackson-Wolinsky by using 
such a w-fair allocation rule. However, the next result rules out this 
possibility.
Th eo rem  4 .4 . Suppose w ?s> 0. Then, there is no w-fair allocation rule Y  
satisfying component balance and such that fo r each v e V ,  at least one 
Wrongly efficient graph is strongly stable.
Proof. Let N =  {1, 2, 3}, and choose any w such that w l ^ w 2 ^ w 3> 0  
and X L i  w ,-=l.
Now, consider the (component additive) v such that v( { ( i j ) } ) =  1, v({(ij),  
( j k ) } )  =  1 + e , and v(gN) =  l +  2e, where s e ( 0 , 1 ( 1  -  (w2/ ( wl +  w3)))).
Using Proposition 4.2, the unique w-fair allocation rule Y  satisfying 
component balance is the weighted Shapley value of uv x. Routine 
calculation yields
Yf{v, g^) =  2ew,- +  w,.(  Wk ----- —— \  for all i, j , k e N  (4.1)
\ W ,  +  Wy W j - \ - W k )
YAv, { ( y ) } ) =  w—  fora11 i’ j e N - (4 -2)w, +  w j
From (4.1) and (4.2), and using X L i  w, =  1
T;(u, {( i j ) } ) -  Y,{v, g N) =  W,. (1  - 2 C - — ( 4. 31
V w i +  wkJ
Remembering that w , 5: w2 ^  Wi and that e <  |(1  — (w ,/(w , +  w3)))), 
(4.3) yields
Yi( v , { ( i j ) } ) - Y i( v , g N) >  0 for i e {  2 ,3 }  (4.4)
which implies that g N is not strongly stable since {2, 3} will break links 
with 1 to move to the graph { (2 ,3 )} . Since g N is the unique strongly 
efficient graph, the theorem follows.
Remark 4.5. Note that since only a pair of agents need form a coalition  
to “block” g N, the result strengthens the intuitive content of the Jackson- 
Wolinsky result.
Our next result uses weak stability instead of strong stability.
T heorem  4.6. There is no fully anonymous allocation rule Y  satisfying 
component balance such that fo r each v e V ,  at least one strongly efficient 
graph is weakly stable.
Proof. Let N =  {1, 2, 3}, and consider v such that v(g'v ) =  1 = v ( { ( i j ) } )  
and v( {(/)'), ( j k ) } ) =  1 +  2e. Assume that 0 <  s <  75 .
Since Y  is fully anonymous and component balanced, Y,(v, { (i j) } ) =  
Yj{v, {(ij)\  ) =  l  Let gJ={ ( i j ) ,  ( j k) \ .  Note that { g J\ j e N }  is the set of 
strongly efficient graphs. Choose any j e N .  Then, Y^v, g 1) ^  For, 
suppose Yj{v, g J) <  \ .  Then, j  can deviate unilaterally to change g J to {(//)} 
or { ( jk) }  by breaking the link with i or k  respectively. So, if Y,(v, g J) <  j
and g j  is induced by s, then s is not a Nash equilibrium, and hence not a 
CPNE.
So, Y,.( v, g ' ) ^ \ .  Since Y  is fully anonymous and component balanced, 
Y,(v, g ') =  Yk(v, g J) <  5 +  e. Again, full anonymity of Y  ensures that 
Y,{v, g w) =  i  for all i e N .
Hence, {/, k)  can deviate from g ’ and form the additional link (ik). This 
will precipitate the complete graph. From preceding arguments, the 
deviation is profitable if e <
Letting s N denote the strategy n-tuple which induces g N, one notes that 
sN is a N ash equilibrium. Hence, the deviation of {/, k } to s N is not 
deterred by the possibility of a further deviation by either i or k. So, g j  is 
not weakly stable. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 4.7. Again note that only a 2-person coalition has to form to 
block g'. So, the result could have been proved in terms of “pairwise weak 
stability,” which is strictly weaker than pairwise stability. Hence, this 
generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky’s basic result.
D e f in it io n  4 .8 . v sa tisfie s  monotonicity i f  for  a ll g e G ,  for  a ll i, j  e  N,
Thus, a monotonic value function has the property that additional links 
never decrease the value of the graph.7 A special class of monotonic value 
functions, the class considered by Dutta et al. [3 ] , is the set o f graph- 
restricted games derived from superadditive TU games. O f course, there are 
also other contexts which might give rise to monotonic value functions. 
Dutta et al. proved that for the class of graph-restricted games derived 
from superadditive TU games, a large class of component balanced 
allocation rules (including all w-fair rules with w P- 0 ) has the property that 
the set o f  weakly stable graphs is a subset o f the set of graphs which are 
payoff-equivalent to g N. Moreover, g N itself is weakly stable. 8 Their proof 
can be easily extended to cover all monotonic value functions. We state the 
following result.
T h e o r e m  4.9. Suppose v is monotonic. Let Y be any w-fair allocation 
rule with w P  0, and satisfying component balance. Then, g N is weakly stable 
for (v, Y). Moreover, i f  g  is weakly stable fo r (v, Y), then g  is payoff-equivalent 
to g N9
7 Hence, g ,v is strongly efficient.
s g  and g ’ are  payoff-equivalent under (r, Y) if Y(v, g ) = Y (i\ g'). Also, no te  th a t if v is 
Wonotonic, th en  g 'v and  hence graphs which are payoff-equivalent, to g  N are strongly efficient.
9 The resu lt is true  for a larger class o f allocation rules, w hich is n o t being defined here to 
save space.
The result is true for a larger class of allocation rules, which is not being 
defined here to save space.
Proof. The proof is omitted since it is almost identical to that of Dutta 
et al. [ 3 ] ,
Remark 4.10. Note that Theorem 4.9 ensures that only strongly efficient 
graphs are weakly stable. Thus, if our prediction is that only weakly stable 
graphs will form, then this result guarantees that there will be no loss in 
efficiency. This guarantee is obviously stronger than that provided if some 
stable graphs is strongly efficient. In the latter case, there is the possibility 
that other stable graphs are inefficient, and since there is no reason to 
predict that only the efficient stable graph will form, inefficiency can still 
occur.
Unfortunately, monotonicity of the value function is a stringent require­
ment. There are a variety of problems in which the optimum network is 
a tree or a ring. For example, cost allocation problems give rise to the 
minimum-cost spanning tree. Efficient airline routing or optimal trading 
arrangements may also imply that the star or ring is the efficient network . 10 
Indeed, in cases where there is a (physical) cost involved in setting up an 
additional link, g N will seldom be the optimal network.
This provides the motivation to follow the “implementation approach’’ 
and prove results similar to that of Theorem 4.9, but covering nonmonotonic 
value functions. First, we construct a component balanced allocation rule 
which is anonymous on the set of strongly stable graphs and which ensures 
that all strongly stable graphs are strongly efficient.
In order to prove this result, we impose a restriction on the class o f value 
functions.
D e f i n i t i o n  4 .1 1 . The set of admissible value functions is V* =  
{v e  V\ v(g) >  0 iff g  is not totally disconnected}.
So, a value function is admissible if all graphs (except the trivial one in 
which no pair of agents is connected) have positive value. 11
Before we formally define the particular allocation rule which will be 
used in the proof of the next theorem, we discuss briefly the key properties 
which will have to be satisfied by the rule.
10 See H endricks et al. [ 6 ]  on the “hub” and “spokes” m odel o f airline routing. See also 
L anda [ 9 ]  for an interesting account of why the ring is the efficient institu tional a rrangem en t 
for organization o f exchange am ongst tribal com m unities in E ast P ap u a  N ew  G uinea.
11 In  com m on with Jackson and W olinsky, we are implicitly assum ing th a t the value o f  a 
disconnected player is zero. This assum ption can be dropped  a t the  cost o f som e com plicated 
notation .
Choose some efficient g * e G .  Suppose s* induces g*, and we want to 
ensure that g*  is strongly stable. Now, consider any g  which is different 
from g*, and let s induce g. Then, the allocation rule must punish at least 
one agent who has deviated from s* to s. This is possible only if a deviant 
can be identified. This is trivial if there is some (ij) e g \g * ,  because then 
both i and j  must concur in forming the extra link (ij). However, if g <=g*, 
say ( i j ) e g * \ g ,  then either i or j  can unilaterally break the link. The only 
way to ensure that the deviant is punished, is to punish both i and j.
Several simple punishment schemes can be devised to ensure that at least 
two agents who have deviated from s* are punished sufficiently to make 
the deviation unprofitable. However, since the allocation rule has to be 
component balanced, these punishment schemes may result in some other 
agent being given more than the agent gets in g*. This possibility creates 
a complication because the punishment scheme has to satisfy an additional 
property. Since we also want to ensure that inefficient graphs are not 
strongly stable, agents have to be provided with an incentive to deviate 
from any graph which is not strongly efficient. Hence, the punishment 
scheme has to be relatively more sophisticated.
Choose some strongly efficient g* with C { g * ) =  { / i f , ..., h*\ ,  and let >■ 
be a strict ordering on arcs of g*. Consider any other graph g, and let 
C{g) =  { h l , . . . ,hK}.
The first step in the construction of the allocation rule is to choose 
agents who will be punished in some components hk e C(g).  For reasons 
which will become clear later on, we only need to worry about components 
hk such that D(hk) =  { i e  N(hk)\(ij) e g*  for some j  $ N( hk)} is nonempty. 
For such components, choose i(hk) =  ik such that V/ e N(hk) \{  ik}, Vw $ N(hk)\
( j m ) e  g* = > ( 4 / ) > ( jw )  for some (ikl ) e  g*,  1$ N(hk). (4.5)
We will say that g  is a *-supergraph of g* if for each h* e C(g*), there 
ish e C (g )  such that N (h*) £  N(h).  Note that the fully connected graph is 
a *-supergraph of every graph.
L e m m a  4.12. Suppose g  =  (//,,..., hK) is not a *-supergraph o f  g*. Then, 
3fc, l e {  1 , K } such that ( iki,) e g*.
Proof. Since g is not a * -supergraph, it follows that g  is not fully connected, 
and that there exists a component h and players i, j  such that i eN(h) ,  
j£N(h)  and (ij) e g*.  Indeed, assume that for each hk e C(g), the set D(hk) 
is nonempty. 12 For every k = \ , 2 , ..., K,  there is j k £ N ( h k) such that 
(<*A)e g* and (ik j k) > ( i j )  for all i e D ( h k) \ { i k} and for all j $ N ( h k) with 
{ij)e g*. Let the ^-m axim al element within the set { ( / , ,  / , ) , . . . ,  (iKj K)} be
12 Otherwise, we can restrict a tten tion  to those com ponents for which D( hk) is nonem pty.
(4* A*)- Let A* £N{hi).  Note that from the definition of the pair ( ik, j k, ). 
it follows that /#& *. Also, (ik, j k>) e g*.  It therefore follows that i, =  
and j , =  ik,.  Hence, (ik, i , ) e  g*. This completes the proof of the lemma.
The implication of Lemma 4.12 is the following. Suppose one or more 
agents deviate from g* to some g e G  with components { h t , ..., hK\ . Then, 
the set of agents { i ( h i ( h K)} must contain a deviator. This property 
will be used intensively in the proof of the next theorem.
T heorem  4.13. Let v e  V*. Then, there is a component balanced allocation 
rule Y* such that the set o f  strongly stable graphs is nonempty and contained 
in E{ v). Moreover, Y* is anonymous on the set o f  strongly stable graphs.
Proof. Choose any v e V * .  Fix g* ei^t;). Let C(g*) =  { h f , ...,h%). An 
allocation rule Y* satisfying the required properties will be constructed 
which ensures that g* is strongly stable. Moreover, no g  will be strongly 
stable unless it is in E(v).
For any S' ^  /V with \ S \ ^2 ,  let Gs be the set of graphs which are connected 
on S, and have no arcs outside 5. So,
Gs ~  {& 6  G | g  is connected on S  and N(g)  =  51} .
Let
v(g)as =  mm
secs |5|(n —2)
Choose any e such that
0 < £ < m i n a v (4.6)
.V £ , V
The allocation rule Y* is defined by the following rules. Choose any g.
(Rule 1) For any h e C( g ) ,  suppose N(h) =  (Ji £ / N(h*)  for some 
(non-empty) / c  {1,..., K \ . Then,
Y f { v , g )  =  V^ -  for all i eN(h) .  
nh
(Rule 2) Suppose N(h) \Jie, N(h*)  V /£  {1,..., K} .  Then, g  is not a 
* -supergraph of g*. Choose j h eN(h)  such that j h =£ih. Then,
r*f., ! )£ lf i ^JhY*(v.  g)  =  •
[v(h) — {nh — l ) 2 £ otherwise.
Clearly, the rule defined above is component balanced. We will show 
later that Y* is anonymous on the set of strongly stable graphs. We 
first show that the efficient graph g*  is strongly stable under the above 
allocation rule.
Let s* be the strategy profile defined as follows: For all i e N ,  s* =  
{ j e N \ ( i j ) e  g*} .  Clearly, s* induces g* in y =  (v, Y*). We need to show 
that s* is a SNE of F(y).
Consider any s # s * , and let g  be induced by s. Also, let T  =  { / e /V| ,y,- /.v * } . 
Suppose h e C{ g ) .  If N(h) =  {J,e l N(h*)  for some nonempty subset I  of 
{ 1 , K) ,  then Yf (v ,  g) =  v(h)jnh for all i eN(h) .  However, since g* is 
efficient, there exists some i s  I  such that v(h*)/nh* ^  v(h)/n/l. So, no 
member of hf  is better-off as a result of the deviation. Also, note that 
T n N ( h f )  # 0 .  So, T  does not have a profitable deviation in this case.
Suppose there is h e C ( g )  such that N(h)  /  l j ,c / N(hf  ) for any nonempty 
subset I  of j 1,..., K ) . Then, g  is not a * -supergraph of g*, and let 
C(g) =  { h u ..., h , } .  From the above lemma, there exists (ikii) e g* where ik 
and it are the players who are punished in hk and h, respectively. 
Obviously, T n  { 4 ,  /,} # <fr. But from Rule (2), it follows that Y*(v, g) =  
(nhk—\ ) s  and Y*(v, g)  =  (nh — 1 )s. Given the value of e, it follows that 
both ik and ih are worse-off from the deviation.
We now show that if g  is strongly stable, then g e E( v ) .  So suppose that 
g is an inefficient graph.
(i) If g  is an inefficient graph which is a *-supergraph of g*, then 
there exist h e C ( g ) ,  h* e C(g*)  such that N(h*)  £  N(h)  and
v(h\ v(h*)
Y f ( v , g )  = ----- < Y f ( v , g * )  = --------  for all i eN(h*) .
nh nh>
So, each i e N ( h * )  can deviate to the strategy ,v*. This will induce the 
component h* where they are all strictly better off.
(ii) Suppose that g  is not a * -supergraph of g*. Let C(g) =  
(hu ..., hK). Without loss of generality, let nh <  • • • <  nhf,. Since g is not a 
*-supergraph of g*, Rule (2) of the allocation rule applies and we know
that there exist hk, h, e  C(g),  and ih e N ( h k), ih eN(h, )  such that Yf  (v, g)k /
= (nhk — 1) £ and Y f  {v, g)  =  (nhi — 1) e. Let s be such that
(i)  Vi${ijv ih},sj = sj.
(“ ) \  =  or j  =  h } -
(iii) s,h =  { j  \ j e s ih o T j  =  ihi} .
Let g  be the graph induced by ,sT. Notice that g  =  g  +  ( i, //,,). We claim that
Y f  ( v , g ) >  Y f  ( v , g ) V j e { i hk, ih) . (4.7)
Let h e  C{g)  be the component containing players i,,k and ih . Notice that 
nh >  max(«A/, nh/). Given the value of e, it follows that
y *  ( v , g )  [n~h -  1) £ V; e {i,,k, ihi\ .
This shows that the coalition { ihk, ih,} has a deviation which makes both 
players better off.
The second half of the proof also shows that g  is strongly stable only if 
g  is a *-supergraph o f g*. From Rule (1), it is clear that Y* is anonymous 
on all such graphs. This observation completes the proof of the theorem.
We have remarked earlier that we need to restrict the class of permissible 
value functions in order to prove the analogue of a “double implementation” 
in strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. In order to explain 
the motivation underlying the restricted class of value functions, we first 
show in Example 4.14 below that the allocation rule used in Theorem 4.13 
cannot be used to prove the double implementation result. In particular, 
this allocation rule does not ensure that weakly stable graphs are efficient.
E x a m p l e  4.14. Let N = {  1,2, 3 ,4 } . Consider a value function such 
that v(g*) =  4, u(g,) =  3.6, v(g2) =  v(g3) =  2.9, where g* =  {(14), (13), (23),
(12)}, g, =  {(12),  (13), (34)}, g 2 =  {(12), (13)} and g 3 =  {(13), (34)}. Also, 
u( { ( ( / ) } ) =  1-6- Finally, the value of other graphs is such that e =  0.4 
satisfies (4.6). Note that g* is the unique efficient graph. Let the strict order 
on links (used in the construction of the allocation rule in Theorem 4.13) 
be given by
(13) >- (23) >  (14) > (1 2 ).
Consider the graph g =  {(12), (34)}. Then, from (Rule 2) and the specifica­
tion of > ,  we have Y?(v, g)  =  Yf(v,  g) =  1.2, Y?(v,  g) =  Y?(v, g) =0.4. 
Now, g is weakly stable, but not efficient.
To see that g  is weakly stable, notice first that agents 2 and 4 have no 
profitable deviation. Second, check using the particular specification of 
>- that Y3*(v, g 2) =  1.3>  Y?(v, g l ) =  0.9, Y*(v, { (1 3 )} )>  Y*(v, g 2) and 
Y 3* (v , g 3)= 0 .8  >  Y*(v, {(13)}) =0.4.
Finally, consider the 2-person link formation game T  with player set 
{ 1 ,3 }  generated from the original game by fixing the strategies of players
2 and 4 at s2 = { l } ,  s4 = { 3 } .  Routine inspection yields that there is no 
Nash equilibrium in this game. This shows that g  is weakly stable.
In order to rule out inefficient graphs from being stable, we need to give 
some coalition the ability to deviate credibly. However, the allocation rule 
constructed earlier fails to ensure this essentially because agents can severe 
links and become the “residual claimant” in the new graph. For instance,
notice that in the previous example, if 3 “deviates” from g, to g 2 by 
breaking ties with 4, then 3 becomes the residual claimant in g 2. Similarly, 
given g 2, 1 breaks links with 2 to establish {(13)}, where she is the residual 
claimant.
To prevent this jockeying for the position of the residual claimant, one 
can impose the condition that on all inefficient graphs, players are 
punished according to a fixed  order. Unfortunately, while this does take 
care of the problem mentioned above, it gives rise to a new problem. It 
turns out that in some cases the efficient graph itself may not be (strongly) 
stable. The following example illustrates this.
E x a m p l e  4.15. Let N  =  {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let g*, the unique efficient graph 
be {(12), (23), (34), (41)}, let g =  {(12), (34)}. Assume that u(g*) = 4  and 
) =  1-5 for all {/, j )  c  N. The values of the other graphs are chosen
so that
min min / — --- , =  0.25.
•S<= N g e Gs ( | A^ | 2 ) |S |
Choose e =  0.25 and let be an ordering on N  such that \ > p 2
3 y~p 4. Applying the allocation rule specified above, it follows that
y ,(v , g*) =  1 for all i e N  
Y2( v , g ) = Y 4(v, g)  =  1.25
and
Y,(v, g)  =  Y3(v, g) =  0.25.
One easily checks that the coalition { 2 , 4} can deviate from the graph g*  
to induce the graph g. This deviation makes both deviators better off. The 
symmetry of the value function on graphs of the form {(zy)} now implies 
that no fixed order will work here.
This explains why we need to impose a restriction on the class of value 
functions. We impose a restriction which ensures that for some efficient 
graph g*,  there is a “central” agent within each component, that is, an agent 
who is connected to every other agent in the component. This restriction 
is defined formally below.
D e f i n i t i o n  4.16. A graph g  is focussed if for each h e C ( g ) ,  there is 
i* 6  N(h)  such that ( ihj ) e h  for all j  e N( h) \ { i h} .
Let V  be the set or all value functions v such that
(i) u(g) =  0 only if g  is completely disconnected.
(ii) There exists g * e E ( v )  such that g*  is focussed.
We now assume that the class of permissible value functions is V. This 
is a much stronger restriction than the assumption used in the previous 
theorem. However, there are several interesting problems which give rise to 
such value functions. Indeed, the two special models discussed by Jackson 
and Wolinsky (the symmetric connections and coauthor models) both give 
rise to value functions in V.
Choose some v e V ,  and let g* eE (v) be focussed. Assume that (h * ,..., h%\ 
are the components of g*,  and let ik be the player who is connected to all 
other players in N(h£) .13
Let > p be a strict order on the player set N  satisfying the following 
conditions:
(i) Vz, j  e N,  if i e N(hk), j  e N(h/) and k <  I. then i > p j.
(ii) h  > Pj  for all y e  N( h£ ) \ { i k}, k =  1 ,.., K.
So, satisfies two properties. First, all agents in N(h*)  are ranked 
above agents in N(h%+1). Second, within each component, the player who 
is connected to all other players is ranked first. Finally, choose any e 
satisfying (4.6).
The allocation rule Y* is defined by the following rules. Choose any g 
and h e C(g).
(Rule 1) Suppose N(h) =  N(h*)  for some h* e C(g*).  Then, 
F * ( v , g ) = - ^ -  for all i eN(h) .
(Rule 2) Suppose N ( h ) c N { h * )  for some h * e C( g*) .  Let j h be the 
“minimal” element of N(h)  under the order Then, for all i e N( h) ,
ifr , W "[v{h) - ( « , , -  l ) 2 £ if l  =  J h .
(Rule 3) Suppose N(h)g:N(h*)  for any h* e C(g*).  Let j h be the 
“minimal” element of N(h) under the order Then, for all i eN( h) ,
'y If m ore than  one such player exists, then any selection rule can be employed.
£
if i *  ih
if i =  jh-
The allocation rule has the following features. First, provided a component 
consists o f the same set of players as some component in g*, the value of 
the component is divided equally amongst all the agents in the component. 
Second, punishments are levied in all other cases. The punishment is more 
severe if players form links across components in g*.
Let s* be the strategy profile given by s* =  { j  e N \ {  ij) e  g* \  for all i e N,  
and let C(g*)  =  { h f ,..., h* } . We first show that if agents in components 
hf,... ,h% are using the strategies s * , then no group of agents in h f  will 
find it profitable to deviate. Moreover, this is independent of the strategies 
chosen by agents in components coming “after” h f .
L e m m a  4.17. Let v e V .  Suppose s is the strategy profile given by 
sj = s f  V/ e  N ( h f ), V/c =  1,..., K  where K ^ K .  Then, there is no s' such that 
P ’i (s ' )> f ] ( s )  j'or all i e T  where fo r all i eN( h*) ,  k < K  and
T= {ieN{h%)\s' i  # 57}.
Proof. Consider the case K — 1. Let g  be the graph induced by s. Note 
that h f e C(g).
Consider any s', and let g' be the graph induced by s'. Suppose T  =
{ i e N ( h f ) \ s , ^ s ' i] # 0 .
Case (1): There exists h e C( g ' )  such that N(h) =  N(h*).
In this case, Rule (1) applies, and we have
So no i e N ( h f )  benefits from the deviation.
Case (2): There exists h e C( g ' )  such that N(h) n  N(hf )  #  <j>, and 
N(h) £N( hf ) .
In this case, Rule (3) applies, and we have
Y  * (v, g ' ) = ~ < Y f  (v, g)  V i e  N ( h f ) n N ( h ) .
Noting that N ( h f ) n N ( h ) n T ^ 0 ,  we must have f ] ( s ) > f ] ' ( s ' )  for some 
ieT.
Case (3): There exists h e  C(g')  such that N{h) c N ( h f ) .
N oting that there is z, who is connected to everyone in N(h*),  either 
z, e T  or T - N ( h ) .  If z, e T, then since f Yh(s') ^  (nh — 1) s <  f yh(s), the lemma 
is true. Suppose is z\ $ T. Ruling out the trivial case where a single agent 
breaks away,14 we have \ T \ ^ 2 .  From Rule 2 or Rule 3, at least one o f the 
agents must be worse off.
Hence, in all possible cases, there is some z e  T  who does not benefit from 
the deviation.
The proof can be extended in an obvious way for all values o f K.
L e m m a  4.18. Let v e V .  Let g be the graph induced by a strategy profile 
s. Suppose there exists h e C ( g ) such that N(h) N(hf) .  Then, g  is not 
weakly stable.
Proof If s is not a Nash equilibrium of T(y),  then there is nothing to 
prove. So, assume that s constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
We will prove the lemma by showing that there is a credible deviation  
from 5 for a coalition D c N ( h f ) ,  \D\ =  2. The game induced on the 
coalition D  is defined as T(y,  sN\ D) =  <D,  { S ,} (e0 , / y> where f j ( s 'D) =  
y*(v, g(s'D, s n \d)) for all j e D .  We show that there is a Nash equilibrium  
in this two-person game which Pareto-dominates the payoff corresponding
to 5.
Suppose there is i e N( hf ) \ N( h) ,  j $ N { h f )  such that ( i j ) eg .  Then, 
S) =  e/2. Since s is a Nash equilibrium, this implies that i by a 
unilateral deviation cannot induce a graph g ’ in which z will be in some 
component such that N(h')
Now, let j  be the -maximal agent in N(h).  Consider the coalition  
D =  { z, j ) . Choose s’, =  { j ] , and let s) be the best response to s', in the game 
F{y, s N\ D). Then, (s', s') must be a Nash equilibrium in T(y, sN\ D).15 U sing  
Rule (2), it is trivial to check that both z and j  gain by deviating to s' 
from s.
Hence, we can now assume that if N(h)  c N(hf) ,  then there exist 
{ h x, ..., hL) s  C(g)  such that N(h?) =  (J,= i, L N (h,).l(> Note that L  ^ 2 .
W.l.o.g., let 1 be the > /;-maximal agent in N {h f ), and 1 e N ( h ,). Let i be 
the > p-maximal agent in N(h2), and let D =  {1, z}.
Suppose L >  2. Then, consider s t =  .j| u { z } , and let s, be the best 
response to in the game T(y,  sNXD). Note that 1 can never be the residual 
claimant in any component, and that 1 e s , . It then follows that (.v,, j,.) is
14 T he agent then gets 0.
15 The fact th a t ; has no profitable deviation from s', follows from  the assum ption th a t  the 
original strategy profile is a N ash equilibrium .
16 Again, we are ignoring the possible existence o f isolated individuals.
a Nash equilibrium in T ( y , s N\ D) which Pareto-dominates the payoffs (of 
D) corresponding to the original strategy profile s.
Suppose L  =  2. Let S =  { j  =  ( s , , j ,, •?_/,) for some ( j , , s,) e S ,  x S,-. Let 
G be the set of graphs which can be induced by D  subject to the restriction 
that both 1 and i belong to a component which is connected on N(h*).  Let 
g be such that u(g) =  maxf;cf; v(g),  and suppose that s induces g. Then, 
note that i e,sT. and 1 e.sT,.
Now, Y*(v,  g)  =  Y?(v,  g)  =  v(g)/nh. Clearly, Yf ( v ,  g) >  Y*(v,  g)  for 
j e D .  If (,sT, , .v,i is a Nash equilibrium in T(y,  ,v v D), then this completes 
the proof of the lemma. Suppose (J ,, s,) is not a Nash equilibrium of 
F{y, sN\ D). Then, the only possibility is that i has a profitable deviation 
since 1 can never become the residual claimant. Let s t be the best response 
to s, in r ( y ,  .v Y /,). Note that 1 e L e t  g  denote the induced graph. We 
must therefore have Yf(v,  g) >  Yf(v,  g ) . xl Obviously, Y f ( v , g ) >  
Yf{v,  g). Since ,v, is also a best response to .v, in F(7 , *vv /J ), this completes 
the proof of the lemma.
We can now prove the following.
T heorem  4.19. Let v e V. Then, there exists a component balanced allocation 
rule Y  satisfying the following
(i) The set o f  strongly stable graphs is nonempty.
(ii) I f  g  is weakly stable, then ge E( v ) .
(iii) Y is anonymous over the set o f  weakly stable graphs.
Proof. Clearly, the allocation rule Y  defined above is component balanced. 
We first show that the efficient graph g*  is strongly stable by showing that 
s* is a strong Nash equilibrium of T(y).
Let C(g*)  =  { h ? , ..., h*}.
Let s ^ s * , g  be the graph induced by s, and T =  \ i e  /V|,v, /.?,*}. Let 
t* =  arg m in,  ^y ^  K s, ^  s f  for some i e N { h f ).
By Lemma 4.17, it follows that at least one member in N(h,.) n T does 
not profit by deviating from the strategy s*. This shows that the graph g* 
is strongly stable.
We now show that if g  is not efficient, then it cannot be weakly stable. 
Let j  be a strategy profile which induces the graph g. We have the follow­
ing cases.
Case (la): There exists h e C(g)  such that N(hf)  =  N(h) and v(h) <  v(hf).
Suppose all individuals i in N( hf )  deviate to s * . Clearly, all individuals 
in N(hf )  gain from this deviation. Moreover Lemma 4.17 shows that no
11 This follows since 1 is now  in a  com ponent contain ing  m ore agents.
subcoalition o  ^N(hf )  has any further profitable deviation. Hence, .s- cannot 
be a CPNE of r(y) in this case.
Case (lb): There does not exist h e C ( g )  such that N(h)  £ N(h*).
In this case all players in N( hf  ) are either isolated (in which case they 
get zero) or they are in (possibly different) components which contain 
players not in N(hf) .  Using Rule (3) of the allocation rule, it follows that
Y f a g ) ^  Vi eN( hf ) .
So all players in N(hf )  can deviate to the strategy s * . Obviously, this 
will make them strictly better off. That this is a credible deviation follows 
from Lemma 4.17.
Case (lc): There exists h e C{g),  such that N(h)  c  N{hf) .
In this case, it follows from Lemma 4.18 that there is a credible deviation 
for a coalition D c N ( h f  ).
Case (2): If there exists h e  C(g ) such that N{h) =  N(h*)  and 
v(h) =  v(hf),  then apply the arguments of Case 1 to h* and so on.
The preceding arguments show that if g  is weakly stable, then:
(i) N(hi) =  N{hf )  for each i e  { 1,..., K }.
(ii) v(hj) =  v(h*) for each i e  { I , ..., K}.
These show that all weakly stable graphs must be efficient. Furthermore, 
it follows from Rule (1) that Y  is anonymous on all such graphs. This 
completes the proof of the theorem.
Notice that in both Theorems 4.13 and 4.19, we have imposed the require­
ment that the allocation rule satisfy component balance on all graphs, and 
not just on the set of stable (or weakly stable) graphs. This raises the 
obvious question as to why the two properties of component balance and 
anonymity have been treated asymmetrically in the paper.
The answer lies in the fact that component balance has a strategic role, 
while anonymity is a purely ethical property. Consider, for instance, the 
“equal division” allocation rule which specifies that each agent gets v(g)/n 
on all graphs g. This rule violates component balance.18 Let the value 
function be such that (u({ 12} )/2) >  (v(g*)/n)  where g* is some efficient 
graph. Then, given the equal division rule, agents / and j  both do strictly 
better by breaking away from the rest of the society since the total reward 
given to them by this allocation rule is less than what they can get by
18 The referee rightly poin ts ou t tha t this ru le im plem ents the set of efficient graphs.
themselves. On the other hand, Theorems 4.13 and 4.19 show that some 
allocation rules which are component balanced ensure that no set o f agents 
wants to break away.
Readers will notice the obvious analogy with the literature on implemen­
tation. There, mechanisms which waste resources “out o f equilibrium” will 
not be renegotiation-proof since all agents can move away to a Pareto-superior 
outcome. Here, the violation of component balance implies that all agents 
in some component can agree on a jointly better outcome.
There is also another logical motivation which can be provided for this 
asymmetric treatment of component balance and anonymity.19 In view of 
the Jackson -Wolinsky result, one or both the conditions must be relaxed 
in order to resolve the tension between stability and efficiency. This paper 
shows that simply relaxing anonymity out of equilibrium is sufficient. 
Since we have also argued that the violation of ethical conditions such as 
anonymity on graphs which are not likely to be observed is not a matter 
for concern, our results suggest an interesting avenue for avoiding the 
potential conflict between stability and efficiency in the context of this 
framework.
5. CONCLUSION
The central theme in this paper has been to examine the possibility of 
constructing allocation rules which will ensure that efficient networks of 
agents form when the individual agents decide to form or severe links amongst 
themselves. Exploiting the insights provided by Jackson and Wolinsky [8 ] ,  
it is shown that in general it may not be possible to reconcile efficiency 
with stability if the allocation rule is required to be anonymous on all 
graphs.
However, we go on to argue that if our prediction is that only efficient 
graphs will form, then the requirement that the allocation rule be anonymous 
on all graphs is unnecessarily stringent. We suggest that a “mechanism 
design” approach is more appropriate and show that under almost all value 
functions, the nonempty set of (strongly) stable graphs will be a subset of 
the efficient graphs under an allocation rule which is anonymous on the 
domain of strongly stable graphs. A stronger domain restriction allows us 
to prove that the above result also holds when strong stability is replaced 
by weak stability. Since these allocation rules will treat agents symmetrically 
on the graphs which are “likely to be observed,” it seems that stability can 
be reconciled with efficiency after all.
19 We are grateful to  the A ssociate E dito r for this suggestion.
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